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Is economics an empirical science?
If not, can it become one?
Sergio M. Focardi 1, 2*
1Department of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA, 2De Vinci Finance Lab,
École Supérieure d’Ingénieurs Léonard de Vinci, Paris, France
Today’s mainstream economics, embodied in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models, cannot be considered an empirical science in the modern sense of the
term: it is not based on empirical data, is not descriptive of the real-world economy, and
has little forecasting power. In this paper, I begin with a review of the weaknesses of
neoclassical economic theory and argue for a truly scientific theory based on data, the
sine qua non of bringing economics into the realm of an empirical science. But I suggest
that, before embarking on this endeavor, we first need to analyze the epistemological
problems of economics to understand what research questions we can reasonably ask
our theory to address. I then discuss new approaches which hold the promise of bringing
economics closer to being an empirical science. Among the approaches discussed
are the study of economies as complex systems, econometrics and econophysics,
artificial economics made up of multiple interacting agents as well as attempts being
made inside present main stream theory to more closely align the theory with the real
world.
Keywords: economics, empirical science, epistemology of economics, econophysics, complex systems, financial
crises
Introduction
In this paper we analyze the status of economics as a science: Can neoclassical economics be
considered an empirical science, eventually only in the making? Are there other approaches that
might better bring economics into the realm of empirical science, with the objective of allowing us
to forecast (at least probabilistically) economic and market phenomena?
While our discussion is centered on economic theory, our considerations can be extended to
finance. Indeed, mainstream finance theory shares the basic framework of mainstream economic
theory, which was developed in the 1960s, 1970s in what is called the “rational expectations
revolution.” The starting point was the so-called Lucas critique. University of Chicago professor
Robert Lucas observed that changes in government policy are made ineffective by the fact that
economic agents anticipate these changes and modify their behavior. He therefore advocated
giving a micro foundation to macroeconomics—that is, explaining macroeconomics in function
of the behavior of individual agents. Lucas was awarded the 1995 Nobel Prize in Economics for
his work.
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The result of the Lucas critique was a tendency, among
those working within the framework of mainstream economic
theory, to develop macroeconomic models based on a multitude
of agents characterized by rational expectations, optimization
and equilibrium1. Following common practice we will refer to
this economic theory as neoclassical economics or mainstream
economics. Mainstream finance theory adopted the same basic
principles as general equilibrium economics.
Since the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the ensuing economic
downturn—neither foreseen (not even probabilistically) by
neoclassical economic theory—the theory has come under
increasing criticism. Many observe that mainstream economics
provides little knowledge from which we can make reliable
forecasts—the objective of science in the modern sense of the
term (for more on this, see Fabozzi et al. [1]).
Before discussing these questions, it is useful to identify the
appropriate epistemological framework(s) for economic theory.
That is, we need to understand what questions we can ask our
theory to address and what types of answers we might expect. If
economics is to become an empirical science, we cannot accept
terms such as volatility, inflation, growth, recession, consumer
confidence, and so on without carefully defining them: the
epistemology of economics has to be clarified.
We will subsequently discuss why we argue that neoclassical
economic and finance theory is not an empirical science as
presently formulated—nor can it become one. We will then
discuss new ideas that offer the possibility of bringing economic
and finance theory closer to being empirical sciences,—in
particular, economics (and finance) based on the analysis of
financial time series (e.g., econometrics) and on the theory of
complexity. These new ideas might be referred to collectively as
“scientific economics.”
We suggest that the epistemological framework of economics
is not that of physics but that of complex systems. After all,
economies are hierarchical complex systems made up of human
agents—complex systems in themselves—and aggregations of
human agents. We will argue that giving a micro foundation to
macroeconomics is a project with intrinsic limitations, typical
of complex systems. These limitations constrain the types of
questions we can ask. Note that the notion of economies as
complex systems is not really new. Adam Smith’s notion of the
“invisible hand” is an emerging property of complex markets.
Even mainstream economics represents economic systems as
complex systems made up of a large number of agents—but it
makes unreasonable simplifying assumptions.
For this and other reasons, economics is a science very
different from the science of physics. It might be that a true
understanding of economics will require a new synthesis of the
1By “neoclassical economics,” we refer to an economic theory based on the notions
of optimization, the efficient market hypothesis, and rational expectations. Among
the major proponents of neoclassical economic thinking are Robert Lucas and
Eugene Fama, both from the University of Chicago and both recipients of the
Nobel Prize in Economics. Because neoclassical economic (and finance) theory
is presently the dominating theory, it is also often referred to as “mainstream”
theory or “the prevailing” theory. Attempts are being made to address some of
the shortfalls of neoclassical economics, such as the consideration of the banking
system, money creation and liquidity.
physical and social sciences given that economies are complex
systems made up of human individuals and must therefore take
into account human values, a feature that does not appear in
other complex systems. This possibility will be explored in the
fourth part of our discussion, but let’s first start with a review of
the epistemological foundations of modern sciences and how our
economic theory eventually fits in.
The Epistemological Foundations of
Economics
The hallmark of modern science is its empirical character:
modern science is based on theories that model or explain
empirical observations. No a priori factual knowledge is assumed;
a priori knowledge is confined to logic and mathematics and,
perhaps, some very general principles related to the meaning of
scientific laws and terms and how they are linked to observations.
There are philosophical and scientific issues associated with this
principle. For example, in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism, van
Orman Quine [2] challenged the separation between logical
analytic truth and factual truth. We will herein limit our
discussion to the key issues with the bearing on economics. They
are:
a. What is the nature of observations?
b. How can empirical theories be validated or refuted?
c. What is the nature of our knowledge of complex systems?
d. What scientific knowledge can we have of mental processes
and of systems that depend on human mental processes?
Let’s now discuss each of these issues.
What is the Nature of Observations?
The physical sciences have adopted the principles of
operationalism as put forward by Bridgman [3], recipient
of 1946 Nobel Prize in Physics, in his book The Logic of Modern
Physics. Operationalism holds that the meaning of scientific
concepts is rooted in the operations needed to measure physical
quantities2 . Operationalism rejects the idea that there are
quantities defined a priori that we can measure with different
(eventually approximate) methods. It argues that the meaning of
a scientific concept is in how we observe (or measure) it.
Operationalism has been criticized on the basis that science,
in particular physics, uses abstract terms such as “mass”
or “force,” that are not directly linked to a measurement
process. See, for example, Hempel [4]. This criticism does not
invalidate operationalism but requires that operationalism as an
epistemological principle be interpreted globally. The meaning
of a physical concept is not given by a single measurement
process but by the entire theory and by the set of all observations.
This point of view has been argued by many philosophers and
2For example, in the Special Relativity Theory, the concept of simultaneity of
distant events is not an a priori concept but depends on how we observe
simultaneity through signals that travel at a finite speed. To determine
simultaneity, we perform operations based on sending and receiving signals that
travel at finite speed. Given the invariance of the speed of light, these operations
make simultaneity dependent on the frame of reference.
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scientists, including Feyerabend [5], Kuhn [6], and van Orman
Quine [2].
But how do we define “observations”? In physics, where
theories have been validated to a high degree of precision, we
accept as observations quantities obtained through complex,
theory-dependent measurement processes. For example, we
observe temperature through the elongation of a column of
mercury because the relationship between the length of the
column of mercury and temperature is well-established and
coherent with other observations such as the change of electrical
resistance of a conductor. Temperature is an abstract term that
enters in many indirect observations, all coherent.
Contrast the above to economic and finance theory where
there is a classical distinction between observables and hidden
variables. The price of a stock is an observable while the
market state of low or high volatility is a hidden variable.
There are a plethora of methods to measure volatility, including:
the ARCH/GARCH family of models, stochastic volatility, and
implied volatility. All these methods are conceptually different
and yield different measurements. Volatility would be a well-
defined concept if it were a theoretical term that is part of a global
theory of economics or finance. But in economics and finance,
the different models to measure volatility use different concepts
of volatility.
There is no global theory that effectively links all true
observations to all hidden variables. Instead, we have many
individual empirical statements with only local links through
specific models. This is a significant difference with respect to
physical theories; it weakens the empirical content of economic
and finance theory.
Note that the epistemology of economics is not (presently)
based on a unified theory with abstract terms and observations.
It is, as mentioned, based on many individual facts. Critics
remark that mainstream economics is a deductive theory, not
based on facts. This is true, but what would be required is a
deductive theory based on facts. Collections of individual facts, for
example financial time series, have, as mentioned, weak empirical
content.
How Can Empirical Theories Be Validated or
Refuted?
Another fundamental issue goes back to the eighteenth century,
when the philosopher-economist David Hume outlined the
philosophical principles of Empiricism. Here is the issue: No
finite series of observations can justify the statement of a general
law valid in all places and at all times, that is, scientific laws cannot
be validated in any conclusive way. The problem of the validation
of empirical laws has been widely debated; the prevailing view
today is that scientific laws must be considered hypotheses
validated by past data but susceptible of being invalidated by
new observations. That is, scientific laws are hypotheses that
explain (or model) known data and observations but there is no
guarantee that new observations will not refute these laws. The
attention has therefore shifted from the problem of validation to
the problem of rejection.
That scientific theories cannot be validated but only refuted
is the key argument in Carl Popper’s influential Conjectures
and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Popper
[7] argued that scientific laws are conjectures that cannot be
validated but can be refuted. Refutations, however, are not a
straightforward matter: Confronted with new empirical data,
theories can, to some extent, be stretched and modified to
accommodate the new data.
The issue of validation and refutation is particularly critical
in economics given the paucity of data. Financial models are
validated with a low level of precision in comparison to physical
laws. Consider, for example, the distribution of returns. It is
known that returns at time horizons from minutes to weeks
are not normally distributed but have tails fatter than those
of a normal distribution. However, the exact form of returns
distributions is not known. Current models propose a range
from inverse power laws with a variety of exponents to stretched
exponentials, but there is no consensus.
Economic and financial models—all probabilistic models—
are validated or refuted with standard statistical procedures.
This leaves much uncertainty given that the choice among
the models and the parameterization of different models are
subject to uncertainty. And in most cases there is no global
theory.
Economic and financial models do not have descriptive power.
This point was made by Friedman [8], University of Chicago
economist and recipient of the 1976 Nobel Prize in Economics.
Friedman argued that economic models are like those in physics,
that is to say, mathematical tools to connect observations. There
is no intrinsic rationality in economic models. We must resist
the temptation to think that there are a priori truths in economic
reasoning.
In summary, economic theories are models that link
observations without any pretense of being descriptive. Their
validation and eventual rejection are performed with standard
statistical methods. But the level of uncertainty is great. As
famously observed by Black [9] in his article “Noise,” “Noise
makes it very difficult to test either practical or academic theories
about the way that financial or economic markets work. We are
forced to act largely in the dark.” That is to say, there is little
evidence that allows us to choose between different economic and
financial models.
What Is the Nature of Our Knowledge of Complex
Systems?
The theory of complex systems has as its objective to explain the
behavior of systems made up of many interacting parts. In our
Introduction, we suggested that the theory of complexity might
be relevant to the analysis of economies and financial time series.
The key theoretical questions are:
â Can the behavior of complex systems be explained in terms
of basic laws?
â Can complex systems be spontaneously created in non-
complex media? Can they continue to evolve and transform
themselves? If so, how?
â Can complex systems be described and, if so, how?
The first question is essentially the following: Can we give a micro
foundation to economics? The second question asks: How do
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economies develop, grow, and transform themselves? The last
question is: Using the theory of complex systems, what type of
economic theory we can hope to develop?
The principle of scientific reductionism holds that the behavior
of any physical system can be reduced to basic physical laws. In
other words, reductionism states that we can logically describe
the behavior of any physical system in terms of its basic physical
laws. For example, the interaction of complex molecules (such
as molecules of drugs and target molecules with which they
are supposed to interact) can in principle be described by
quantum mechanical theories. The actual computation might
be impossibly long in practice but, in theory, the computation
should be possible.
Does reductionism hold for very complex physical systems?
Can any property of a complex system be mathematically
described in terms of basic physical laws? Philip Warren
Anderson, co-recipient of the 1977 Nobel Prize in Physics,
conjectured in his article “More is different” [10] that complex
systems might exhibit properties that cannot be explained in
terms of microscopic laws. This does not mean that physical
laws are violated in complex systems; rather it means that in
complex systems there are aggregate properties that cannot be
deduced with a finite chain of logical deductions from basic
laws. This impossibility is one of the many results on the
limits of computability and the limits of logical deductions that
were discovered after the celebrated theorem of Goedel on the
incompleteness of formal logical systems.
Some rigorous results can be obtained for simple systems.
For example, Gu et al. [11] demonstrated that an infinite Ising
lattice exhibits properties that cannot be computed in any finite
time from the basic laws governing the behavior of the lattice.
This result is obtained from well-known results of the theory of
computability. In simple terms, even if basic physical laws are
valid for any component of a complex system, in some cases
the chains of deduction for modeling the behavior of aggregate
quantities become infinite. Therefore, no finite computation can
be performed.
Reductionism in economic theory is the belief that we
can give a micro foundation to macroeconomics, that is, that
we can explain aggregate economic behavior in terms of the
behavior of single agents. As mentioned, this was the project of
economic theory following the Lucas critique. As we will see in
Section What Is the Cognitive Value of Neoclassical Economics,
Neoclassical Finance? this project produced an idealized concept
of economies, far from reality.
We do not know how economic agents behave, nor do we
know if and how their behavior can be aggregated to result in
macroeconomic behavior. It might well be that the behavior of
each agent cannot be computed and that the behavior of the
aggregates cannot be computed in terms of individuals. While
the behavior of agents has been analyzed in some experimental
setting, we are far from having arrived at a true understanding of
agent behavior.
This is why a careful analysis of the epistemology of economics
is called for. If our objective is to arrive at a science of economics,
we should ask only those questions that we can reasonably
answer, and refrain from asking questions and formulating
theories for which there is no possible empirical evidence or
theoretical explanation.
In other words, unless we make unrealistic simplifications,
giving a micro foundation to macroeconomics might prove
to be an impossible task. Neoclassical economics makes
such unrealistic simplifications. A better approximation to a
realistic description of economics might be provided by agent-
based systems, which we will discuss later. But agent-based
systems are themselves complex systems: they do not describe
mathematically, rather they simulate economic reality. A truly
scientific view of economics should not be dogmatic, nor should
it assume that we can write an aggregate model based on micro-
behavior.
Given that it might not be possible to describe the behavior
of complex systems in terms of the laws of their components,
the next relevant question is: So how can we describe complex
systems? Do complex systems obey deterministic laws dependent
on the individual structure of each system, which might be
discovered independently from basic laws (be they deterministic
or probabilistic)? Or do complex systems obey statistical laws? Or
is the behavior of complex systems simply unpredictable?
It is likely that there is no general answer to these questions. A
truly complex system admits many different possible descriptions
in function of the aggregate variables under consideration. It
is likely that some aggregate properties can be subject to study
while others are impossible to describe. In addition, the types
of description might vary greatly. Consider the emission of
human verbal signals (i.e., speech). Speech might indeed have
near deterministic properties in terms of the formation rules,
grammar, and syntax. If we move to the semantic level, speech
has different laws in function of cultures and domains of interest
which we might partially describe. But modeling the daily
verbal emissions of an individual likely remains beyond any
mathematical and computational capability. Only broad statistics
can be computed.
If we turn to economics, when we aggregate output in terms
of prices, we see that the growth of the aggregate output is subject
to constraints, such as the availability of money, that make the
quantitative growth of economies at least partially forecastable.
Once more, it is important to understand for what questions we
might reasonably obtain an answer.
There are additional fundamental questions regarding
complex systems. For example, as mentioned above: Can global
properties spontaneously emerge in non-complex systems
and if so, how? There are well-known examples of simple
self-organizing systems such as unsupervised neural networks.
But how can we explain the self-organizing properties of
systems such as economic systems or financial markets? Can
it be explained in terms of fundamental laws plus some added
noise? While simple self-organizing behavior has been found
in simulated systems, explaining the emergence and successive
evolution of very complex systems remains unresolved.
Self-organization is subject to the same considerations made
above regarding the description of complex systems. It is well
possible that the self-organization of highly complex systems
cannot be described in terms of the basic laws or rules of behavior
of the various components. In some systems, there might be no
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finite chain of logical deductions able to explain self-organization.
This is a mathematical problem, unrelated to the failure or
insufficiency of basic laws. Explaining self-organization becomes
another scientific problem.
Self-organization is a key concept in economics. Economies
and markets are self-organizing systems whose complexity has
increased over thousands of years. Can we explain this process
of self-organization? Can we capture the process that makes
economies and markets change their own structure, adopt new
models of interaction?
No clear answer is yet available. Chaitin [12] introduced the
notion of metabiology and has suggested that it is possible to
provide a mathematical justification for Darwinian evolution.
Arguably one might be able to develop a “metaeconomics” and
provide some clue as to how economies or markets develop3 .
Clearly there are numerous epistemological questions related
to the self-organization of complex systems. Presently these
questions remain unanswered at the level of scientific laws.
Historians, philosophers, and social scientists have proposed
many explanations of the development of human societies.
Perhaps the most influential has been Hegel’s Dialectic, which
is the conceptual foundation of Marxism. But these explanations
are not scientific in the modern sense of the term.
It is not obvious that complex systems can be handled with
quantitative laws. Laws, if they exist, might be of a more general
logical nature (e.g., logical laws). Consider the rules of language—
a genuine characteristic of the complex system that is the
human being: there is nothing intrinsically quantitative. Nor are
DNA structures intrinsically quantitative. So with economic and
market organization: they are not intrinsically quantitative.
What Scientific Knowledge Can We Have of Our
Mental Processes and of Systems That Depend
on Them?
We have now come to the last question of importance to our
discussion of the epistemological foundations of modern science:
What is the place of mental experience in modern science? Can
wemodel the process through which humansmake decisions? Or
is human behavior essentially unpredictable? The above might
seem arcane philosophical or scientific speculation, unrelated
to economics or finance. Perhaps, Except that whether or not
economics or finance can be studied as a science depends, at least
to some extent, on if and how human behavior can be studied as
a science.
Human decision-making shapes the course of economies and
financial markets: economics and finance can become a science if
human behavior can be scientifically studied, at least at some level
of aggregation or observability. Most scientific efforts on human
behavior have been devoted to the study of neurodynamics
and neurophysiology. We have acquired a substantial body of
knowledge on how mental tasks are distributed to different
regions of the brain. We also have increased our knowledge of
the physiology of nervous tissues, of the chemical and electrical
exchanges between nervous cells. This is, of course, valuable
3The term “metaeconomics” is currently used in a different sense. See Section
Econophysics and Econometrics below. Here we use metaeconomics in analogy
with Chaitin’s metabiology.
knowledge from both the practical and the theoretical points of
view.
However, we are still far from having acquired any real
understanding of mental processes. Even psychology, which
essentially categorizes mental events as if they were physical
objects, has not arrived at an understanding of mental events.
Surely we now know a lot on how different chemicals might
affect mental behavior, but we still have no understanding of the
mental processes themselves. For example, a beam of light hits a
human eye and the conscious experience of a color is produced.
How does this happen? Is it the particular structure of molecules
in nerve cells that enables vision? Can we really maintain
that structure “generates” consciousness? Might consciousness
be generated through complex structures, for example with
computers? While it is hard to believe that structure in itself
creates consciousness, consciousness seems to appear only in
association with very complex structures of nerve cells.
John von Neumann [13] was the first to argue that brains,
and more in general any information processing structure,
can be represented as computers. This has been hotly debated
by scientists and philosophers and has captured popular
imagination. In simple terms, the question is: Can computers
think? In many discussions, there is a more or less explicit
confusion between thinking as the ability to perform tasks and
thinking as having an experience.
It was Alan Turing who introduced a famous test to determine
if a machine is intelligent. Turing [14] argued that if a machine
can respond to questions as a human would do, then the machine
has to be considered intelligent. But Turing’s criterion says
nothing as regards the feelings and emotions of the machine.
In principle we should be able to study human behavior just as
we study the behavior of a computer as both brain and computer
are made of earthly materials. But given the complexity of the
brain, it cannot be assumed that we can describe the behavior of
functions that depend on the brain, such as economic or financial
decision-making, with a mathematical or computational model.
A key question in studying behavior is whether we have to
include mental phenomena in our theories. The answer is not
simple. It is common daily experience that we make decisions
based on emotions. In finance, irrational behavior is a well-
known phenomenon (see Shiller [15]). Emotions, such as greed
or fear, drive individuals to “herd” in and out of investments
collectively, thereby causing the inflation/deflation of asset prices.
Given that we do not know how to represent and model
the behavior of complex systems such as the brain, we cannot
exclude that mental phenomena are needed to explain behavior.
For example, a trader sees the price of a stock decline rapidly and
decides to sell. It is possible that we will not be able to explain
mathematically this behavior in terms of physics alone and have
to take into account “things” such as fear. But for the moment,
our scientific theories cannot include mental events.
Let’s now summarize our discussion on the study of
economies or markets as complex systems. We suggested that the
epistemological problems of the study of economies and markets
are those of complex systems. Reductionism does not always
work in complex systems as the chains of logical deductions
needed to compute the behavior of aggregates might become
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infinite. Generally speaking, the dynamics of complex systems
needs to be studied in itself, independent of the dynamics of
the components. There is no unique way to describe complex
systems: a multitude of descriptions corresponding to different
types of aggregation are possible. Then there are different ways of
looking at complex systems, from different levels of aggregation
and from different conceptual viewpoints. Generally speaking,
truly complex systems cannot be described with a single set of
laws. The fact that economies andmarkets are made up of human
individuals might require the consideration of mental events and
values. If, as we suggest, the correct paradigm for understanding
economies and finance is that of complex systems, not that of
physics, the question of how to do so is an important one. We
will discuss this in Section Econophysics and Econometrics.
Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the epistemology of
economics.
What Is the Cognitive Value of Neoclassical
Economics, Neoclassical Finance?
As discussed above, there are difficult epistemological questions
related to the study of economics and finance, questions that
cannot be answered in a naïve way, questions such as “What
do we want to know?”, “What can we know?”, or questions that
cannot be answered at all or that need to be reformulated. Physics
went through a major conceptual crisis when it had to accept
that physical laws are probabilistic and do not describe reality
but are subject to the superposition of events. In economics and
finance, we have to think hard to (re)define our questions—they
might not be as obvious we think: economies and markets are
complex systems; the problems must be carefully conceptualized.
We will now analyze the epistemological problems of neoclassical
economics and, by extension, of neoclassical finance.
First, what is the cognitive value of neoclassical economics?
As observed above, neoclassical economics is not an empirical
science in the modern sense of the term; rather neoclassical
economics is a mathematical model of an idealized object that is
far from reality.Wemight say that the neoclassical economics has
opened the way to the study of economics as a complex system
made of agents which are intelligent processors of information,
capable of making decisions on the basis of their forecasts.
However, its spirit is very different from that of complex systems
theory.
Neoclassical economics is essentially embodied in Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, the first of
which was developed by Fynn Kidland and Edward Prescott,
co-recipients of the 2004 Nobel Prize in Economics. DSGEs
were created to give a micro foundation to macroeconomics
following the Lucas critique discussed above. In itself sensible,
anchoring macro behavior to micro-behavior, that is, explaining
macroeconomics in terms of the behavior of individuals
(or agents), is a challenging scientific endeavor. Sensible
because effectively the evolution of economic quantities depends
ultimately on the decisions made by individuals using their
knowledge but also subject to emotions. Challenging, however,
because (1) rationalizing the behavior of individuals is difficult,
perhaps impossible and (2) as discussed above, it might not be
possible to represent mathematically (and eventually to compute)
the aggregate behavior of a complex system in terms of the
behavior of its components.
These considerations were ignored in the subsequent
development of economic and finance theory. Instead of looking
with scientific humility to the complexity of the problem, an
alternative idealized model was created. Instead of developing
as a science, mainstream economics developed as highly
sophisticated mathematical models of an idealized economy.
DSGEs are based on three key assumptions:
â Rational expectations
â Equilibrium
â Optimization
TABLE 1 | Similarities and differences between the physical sciences, mainstream economics, and hypothetical future scientific economics.
Characteristics Physical sciences Mainstream economics Scientific economics
Strictly based on empirical data Yes No Yes, but possibly not completely
Observation Obtained through a well-defined
observation process, global, dependent
on theory
Local, often a priori Local, but obtained through a well-defined observation
process
Reductionism (Microfoundation
in economics)
True in physics, questionable in complex
systems
Remains an idealization, no true
microfoundation is feasible
Fundamental limitations
Interpretation Generally accepted that theories are not
descriptive, but there are realist
interpretations of physical theories
General equilibrium theories are
descriptive in their original aim,
in practice they are abstract
models
Rather than be descriptive, it is likely that that future
theories be abstract models
Self organization Present in complex systems, no
consensus
Absent, ignored No consensus, no shared theory
Human perceptions Not part of the theory, but used for the
philosophical background
Assumed rationality Questionable, might be necessary, no definite conclusion
Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics | www.frontiersin.org 6 July 2015 | Volume 1 | Article 7
Focardi Is economics an empirical science?
From a scientific point of view, the idealizations of neoclassical
economics are unrealistic. No real agent can be considered a
rational-expectations agent: real agents do not have perfect
knowledge of future expectations. The idea of rational
expectations was put forward by Muth [16] who argued
that, on average, economic agents make correct forecasts for the
future—clearly a non-verifiable statement: we do not know the
forecasts made by individual agents and therefore cannot verify
if their mean is correct. There is little conceptual basis in arguing
that, on average, people make the right forecasts of variables
subject to complex behavior. It is obvious that, individually,
we are uncertain about the future; we do not even know what
choices we will have to make in the future.
There is one instance where average expectations and
reality might converge, at least temporarily. This occurs when
expectations change the facts themselves, as happens with
investment decision-making where opinions lead to decisions
that confirm the opinions themselves. This is referred to as “self-
reflectivity.” For example, if on average investors believe that the
price of a given stock will go up, they will invest in that stock
and its price will indeed go up, thereby confirming the average
forecast. Investment opinions become self-fulfilling prophecies.
However, while investment opinions can change the price of
a stock, they cannot change the fundamentals related to that
stock. If investment opinions were wrong because based on a
wrong evaluation of fundamentals, at a certain point opinions,
and subsequently the price, will change.
Forecasts are not the only problem with DSGEs. Not only do
we not know individual forecasts, we do not know how agents
make decisions. The theoretical understanding of the decision-
making process is part of the global problem of representing
and predicting behavior. As observed above, individual behavior
is the behavior of a complex system (in this case, the human
being) and might not be predictable, not even theoretically.
Let’s refine this conclusion: We might find that, at some level
of aggregation, human behavior is indeed predictable—at least
probabilistically.
One area of behavior that has been mathematically modeled
is the process of rational decision-making. Rational decision-
making is a process of making coherent decisions. Decisions are
coherent if they satisfy a number of theoretical axioms such as
if choice A is preferred to choice B and choice B is preferred to
choice C, then choice A must be preferred to choice A. Coherent
decisions can be mathematically modeled by a utility function,
that is a function defined on every choice such that choice A is
preferred to choice B if the utility of A is higher than the utility of
B. Utility is purely formal. It is not unique: there are infinite utility
functions that correspond to the same ordering of decisions.
The idea underlying the theory of decisions and utility
functions is that the complexity of human behavior, the eventual
free will that might characterize the decision-making process,
disappears when we consider simple business decisions such
as investment and consumption. That is, humans might be
very complex systems but when it comes to questions such as
investments, they all behave in the same formal way, i.e., they all
maximize the utility function.
There are several difficulties with representing agent decision-
making as utility maximization. First, real agents are subjects to
many influences, mutual interactions and other influences that
distort their decisions. Numerous studies of empirical finance
have shown that people do not behave according to the precepts
of rational decision making. Although DSGEs can be considered
a major step forward in economics, the models are, in fact, mere
intellectual constructions of idealized economies. Even assuming
that utility maximization does apply, there is no way to estimate
the utility function(s) of each agent. DSGEs do not describe real
agents nor do they describe how expectations are formed. Real
agents might indeed make decisions based on past data from
which they might make forecasts; they do not make decisions
based on true future expectations. Ultimately, a DSGE model in
its original form cannot be considered scientific.
Because creating models with a “realistic” number of
agents (whatever that number might be) would be practically
impossible, agents are generally collapsed into a single
representative agent by aggregating utility functions. However,
as shown by Sonnensheim-Mantel-Debreu [17], collapsing
agents into a single representative agent does not preserve the
conditions that lead to equilibrium. Despite this well-known
theoretical result, models used by central banks and other
organizations represent economic agents with a single aggregate
utility functional.
Note that the representative agent is already amajor departure
from the original objective of Lucas, Kidland, and Prescott to give
a micro foundation to macroeconomics. The aggregate utility
functional is obviously not observable. It is generally assumed
that the utility functional has a convenient mathematical
formulation. See for example, Smets and Wouters [18] for a
description of one such model.
There is nothing related to the true microstructure of the
market in assuming a global simple utility function for an entire
economy. In addition, in practice DSGE models assume simple
processes, such as AutoRegressive processes, to make forecasts
of quantities, as, for example, in Smets and Wouters [18] cited
above.
What remains of the original formulation of the DSGE is
the use of Euler equations and equilibrium conditions. But this
is only a mathematical formalism to forecast future quantities.
Ultimately, in practice, DSGE models are models where a simple
utility functional is maximized under equilibrium conditions,
using additional ad hoc equations to represent, for example,
production.
Clearly, in this formulation DSGEs are abstract models of
an economy without any descriptive power. Real agents do
not appear. Even the forward-looking character of rational
expectations is lost because these models obviously use only past
data which are fed to algorithms that include terms such as utility
functions that are assumed, not observed.
How useful are these models? Empirical validation is limited.
Being equilibrium models, DSGEs cannot predict phenomena
such as boom-bust business cycles. The most cogent illustration
has been their inability to predict recent stockmarket crashes and
the ensuing economic downturns.
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Econophysics and Econometrics
In Section The Epistemological Foundations of Economics, we
discussed the epistemological issues associated with economics;
in Section What Is the Cognitive Value of Neoclassical
Economics, Neoclassical Finance? We critiqued mainstream
economics, concluding that it is not an empirical scientific theory.
In this and the following section we discuss new methods, ideas,
and results that are intended to give economics a scientific
foundation as an empirical science. We will begin with a
discussion of econophysics and econometrics.
The term Econophysics was coined in 1995 by the physicist
Eugene Stanley. Econophysics is an interdisciplinary research
effort that combines methods from physics and economics. In
particular, it applies techniques from statistical physics and non-
linear dynamics to the study of economic data and it does so
without the pretense of any a priori knowledge of economic
phenomena.
Econophysics obviously overlaps the more traditional
discipline of econometrics. Indeed, it is difficult to separate
the two in any meaningful way. Econophysics also overlaps
economics based on artificial markets formed by many
interacting agents. Perhaps a distinguishing feature of
econophysics is its interdisciplinarity, though one can
reasonably argue that any quantitative modeling of financial or
economic phenomena shares techniques with other disciplines.
Another distinguishing feature is its search for universal laws;
econometrics is more opportunistic. However, these distinctions
are objectively weak. Universality in economics is questionable
and econometrics uses methods developed in pure mathematics.
To date, econophysics has focused on analyzing financial
markets. The reason is obvious: financial markets generate huge
quantities of data. The availability of high-frequency data and
ultra-high-frequency data (i.e., tick-by-tick data) has facilitated
the use of the methods of physics. For a survey of Econophysics,
see in particular Lux [19] and Chakraborti et al. [20]; see Gallegati
et al. [21] for a critique of econophysics from inside.
The main result obtained to date by econophysics is the
analysis and explanation of inverse power law distributions
empirically found in many economic and financial phenomena.
Power laws have been known and used for more than a century,
starting with the celebrated Pareto law of income distribution.
Power law distributions were proposed in finance in the 1950s,
for example byMandelbrot [22].More recently, econophysics has
performed a systematic scientific study of power laws and their
possible explanations.
Time series or cross sectional data characterized by inverse
power law distributions have special characteristics that are
important for economic theory as well as for practical
applications such as investment management. Inverse power
laws characterize phenomena such that very large events are not
negligibly rare. The effect is that individual events, or individual
agents, become very important.
Diversification, which is a pillar of classical finance and
investment management, becomes difficult or nearly impossible
if distributions follow power laws. Averages lose importance
as the dynamics of phenomena is dominated by tail events.
Given their importance in explaining economic and financial
phenomena, we will next briefly discuss power laws.
Power Laws
Let’s now look at the mathematical formulation of distributions
characterized by power laws and consider some examples of how
they have improved our understanding of economic and financial
phenomena.
The tails of the distribution of a random variable r follow
an inverse power law if the probability of the tail region decays
hyperbolically:
P (|r| > x) ≈ x−α.
The properties of the distribution critically depend on the
magnitude of the exponent α. Values α < 2 characterize Levy
distributions with infinite variance and infinite mean if α < 1;
values α > 2 characterize distributions with finite mean and
variance.
Consider financial returns. Most studies place the value
of α for financial returns at around 3 [19]. This finding is
important because values α < 2 would imply invariance of
the distribution, and therefore of the exponent, with respect to
summation of variables. That is, the sum of returns would have
the same exponent of the summands. This fact would rule out the
possibility of any diversification and would imply that returns at
any time horizon have the same distribution. Instead, values of α
at around 3 imply that variables become normal after temporal
aggregation on sufficiently long time horizons. This is indeed
what has been empirically found: returns become normal over
periods of 1 month or more.
Power laws have also been found in the autocorrelation of
volatility. In general the autocorrelation of returns is close to
zero. However, the autocorrelation of volatility, (measured by the
autocorrelation of the absolute value of returns, or the square of
returns), decays as an inverse power law:
cov (|rt| , |rt−1t| > x) ≈ 1t
−γ
The typical exponent found empirically is 0.3. Such a small
exponent implies a long-term dependence of volatility.
Power laws have been found in other phenomena. Trading
volume decays as a power law; power laws have also been found in
the volume and number of trades per time unit in high-frequency
data; other empirical regularities have been observed, especially
for high-frequency data.
As for economic phenomena more in general, power laws
have been observed in the distribution of loans, the market
capitalization of firms, and income distribution - the original
Pareto law. Power laws have also been observed in non-financial
phenomena such as the distribution of the size of cities4 .
Power law distributions of returns and of volatility appear
to be a universal feature in all liquid markets. But Gallegati
et al. [21] suggest that the supposed universality of these
empirical findings (which do not depend on theory) is subject
4Power laws are ubiquitous in physics where many phenomena, such as the size of
ferromagnetic domains, are characterized by power laws.
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to much uncertainty. In addition, there is no theoretical reason
to justify the universality of these laws. It must be said that
the level of validation of each finding is not extraordinarily
high. For example, distributions other than power laws have
been proposed, including stretched exponentials and tempered
distributions. There is no consensus on any of these findings.
As observed in Section The Epistemological Foundations of
Economics, the empirical content of individual findings is low;
it is difficult to choose between the competing explanations.
Attempts have been made to offer theoretical explanations
for the findings of power laws. Econophysicists have tried to
capture the essential mechanisms that generate power laws. For
example, it has been suggested that power laws in one variable
naturally lead to power laws in other variables. In particular,
power law distributions of the size of market capitalization or
similar measures of the weight of investors explain most other
financial power laws [23]. The question is: How were the original
power laws generated?
Two explanations have been proposed. The first is based
on non-linear dynamic models. Many, perhaps most, non-
linear models create unconditional power law distributions. For
example, the ARCH/GARCHmodels create unconditional power
laws of the distribution of returns though the exponents do not
fit empirical data. The Lux-Marchesi dynamic model of trading
[24] was the first model able to explain power laws of both returns
and autocorrelation time.Many other dynamicmodels have since
been proposed.
A competing explanation is based on the properties of
percolation structures and random graph theory, as originally
proposed by Cont and Bouchaud [25]. When the probability of
interaction between adjacent nodes approaches a critical value
that depends on the topology of the percolation structure or the
random graph, the distribution of connected components follows
a power law. Assuming financial agents can be represented by
the nodes of a random graph, demand created by aggregation
produces a fat-tailed distribution of returns.
Random Matrices
Econophysics has also obtained important results is in the
analysis of large covariance and correlation matrices, separating
noise from information. For example, financial time series
of returns are weakly autocorrelated but strongly correlated.
Correlation matrices play a fundamental role in portfolio
management and many other financial applications.
However, estimating correlation and covariance matrices for
large markets is problematic due to the fact that the number of
parameters to estimate (i.e., the entries of the covariance matrix)
grows with the square of the number of time series, while the
number of available data is only proportional to the number
of time series. In practice, the empirical estimator of a large
covariance matrix is very noisy and cannot be used. Borrowing
from physics, econophysicists suggest a solution based on the
theory of random matrices which has been applied to solve
problems in quantum physics.
The basic idea of random matrices is the following. Consider
a sample of N time series of length T. Suppose the series are
formed by independent and identically distributed zero mean
normal variables. In the limit of N and T going to infinity with
a constant ratio Q = T/N, the distribution of the eigenvalues of
these series was determined by Marchenko Pastur [26]. Though
the law itself is a simple algebraic function, the demonstration is
complicated. The remarkable finding is that there is a universal
theoretical distribution of eigenvalues in an interval that depends
only on Q.
This fact suggested a method for identifying the number
of meaningful eigenvalues of a large covariance matrix: Only
those eigenvalues that are outside the interval of the Marcenko-
Pastur law are significant (see Plerou et al. [27]). A covariance
matrix can therefore be made robust computing the Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) and using only those principal
components corresponding to meaningful eigenvalues. Random
matrix theory has been generalized to include correlated and
autocorrelated time series and non-normal distributions (see
Burda et al. [28]).
Econometrics and VAR Models
As mentioned above, the literature on econophysics overlaps
with the econometric literature. Econometricians have developed
methods to capture properties of time series and model their
evolution. Stationarity, integration and cointegration, and the
shifting of regimes are properties and models that come from the
science of econometrics.
The study of time series has opened a new direction in the
study of economics with the use of Vector Auto Regressive (VAR)
models. VAR models were proposed by Christopher Sims in
the 1980s (for his work, Sims shared the 2011 Nobel Prize in
Economics with Thomas Sargent). Given a vector of variables,
a VAR model represents the dynamic of the variables as the
regression of each variable over lagged values of all variables:
Xt = c+ A1Xt−1 + · · · + ApXt−p + εt.
The use of VAR models in economics is typically associated with
dimensionality reduction techniques. As currently tens or even
hundreds of economic time series are available, PCA or similar
techniques are used to reduce the number of variables so that the
VAR parameters can be estimated.
What are the similarities and differences between
econometrics and econophysics? Both disciplines try to find
mathematical models of economic and/or financial variables.
One difference between the two disciplines is perhaps the fact
that econophysics attempts to find universal phenomena shared
by every market. Econometricians, on the other hand, develop
models that can be applied to individual time series without
considering their universality. Hence econometricians focus
on methods of statistical testing because the applicability of
models has to be tested in each case. This distinction might
prove to be unimportant as there is no guarantee that we can find
universal laws. Thus far, no model has been able to capture all
the features of financial time series: Because each model requires
an independent statistical validation, the empirical content
is weak.
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New Directions in Economics
We will now explore some new directions in economic theory.
Let’s start by noting that we do not have a reasonably well-
developed, empirically validated theory of economics. Perhaps
the most developed field is the analysis of instabilities as well
as economic simulation. The main lines of research, however,
are clear and represent a departure from the neoclassical theory.
They can be summarized thus:
1. Social values and objectives must be separated from economic
theory, that is, we have to separate political economics from
pure economic theory. Economies are systems in continuous
evolution. This fact is not appreciated in neoclassical
economics which considers only aggregated quantities.
2. The output of economies is primarily the creation of order and
complexity, both at the level of products and social structures.
Again, this fact is ignored by neoclassical economics, which
takes a purely quantitative approach without considering
changes in the quality of the output or the power structure of
economies.
3. Economies are never in a state of equilibrium, but are subject
to intrinsic instabilities.
4. Economic theory needs to consider economies as physical
systems in a physical environment; it therefore needs to take
into consideration environmental constraints.
Let’s now discuss how new directions in economic theory are
addressing the above.
Economics and Political Economics
As mentioned above, economic theory should be clearly
separated from political economics. Economies are human
artifacts engineered to serve a number of purposes. Most
economic principles are not laws of nature but reflect social
organization. As in any engineering enterprise, the engineering
objectives should be kept separate from the engineering itself and
the underlying engineering principles and laws. Determining the
objectives is the realm of political economics; engineering the
objectives is the realm of economic theory.
One might object that there is a contradiction between the
notion of economies as engineered artifacts and the notion of
economies as evolving systems subject to evolutionary rules.
This contradiction is akin to the contradiction between studying
human behavior as a mechanistic process and simultaneously
studying how to improve ourselves.
We will not try to solve this contradiction at a fundamental
level. Economies are systems whose evolution is subject
to uncertainty. Of course the decisions we make about
engineering our economies are part of the evolutionary process.
Pragmatically, if not philosophically, it makes sense to render our
objectives explicit.
For example, Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
wrote an entry in the VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal (http://www.
voxeu.org/article/cuddly-or-cut-throat-capitalism-choosing-mo
dels-globalised-world) noting that we have the option to
choose between different forms of capitalism (see, for example,
in Hall and Soskice [29]), in particular, between what they
call “cuddly capitalism” or “cut-throat capitalism.” It makes
sense, pragmatically, to debate what type of system, in this
case of capitalism, we want. An evolutionary approach, on
the other hand, would study what decisions were/will be
made.
The separation between objectives and theory is not always
made clear, especially in light of political considerations. Actually,
there should be multiple economic theories corresponding to
different models of economic organization. Currently, however,
the mainstream model of free markets is the dominant model;
any other model is considered either an imperfection of the
free-market competitive model or a failure, for example Soviet
socialism. This is neither a good scientific attitude nor a good
engineering approach. The design objectives of our economies
should come first, then theory should provide the tools to
implement the objectives.
New economic thinking is partially addressing this need.
In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and
the subsequent questioning of mainstream economics, some
economists are tackling socially-oriented issues, in particular,
the role and functioning of the banking system, the effect of
the so-called austerity measures, and the social and economic
implications of income and wealth inequality.
There is a strain of economic literature, albeit small, known as
meta-economics, that is formally concerned with the separation
of the objectives and the theory in economics. The term
metaeconomics was first proposed by Karl Menger, an Austrian
mathematician and member of the Vienna Circle5 . Influenced
by David Hilbert’s program to give a rigorous foundation to
mathematics, Menger proposedmetaeconomics as a theory of the
logical structure of economics.
The term metaeconomics was later used by Schumacher [30]
to give a social and ethical foundation to economics, and is now
used in this sense by behavioral economists. Metaeconomics, of
course, runs contrary to mainstream economics which adheres to
the dogma of optimality and excludes any higher-level discussion
of objectives.
Economies as Complex Evolving Systems
What are the characteristics of evolutionary complex systems
such as our modern economies? An introduction can be found in
Beinhocker [31]. Associated with the Institute for New Economic
Thinking (INET)6 , Beinhocker attributes toNicholas Georgescu-
Roegen many of the new ideas in economics that are now
receiving greater attention.
Georgescu-Roegen [32] distinguishes two types of evolution,
slow biological evolution and the fast cultural evolution typical
of modern economies. Thus, the term bioeconomics. The entropy
accounting of the second law of thermodynamics implies that
any local increase of order is not without a cost: it requires
5Karl Menger was the son of the economist Carl Menger, the founder of the
Austrian School of Economics.
6The Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) is a not-for profit think tank
whose purpose is to support academic research and teaching in economics “outside
the dominant paradigms of efficient markets and rational expectations.” Founded
in 2009 with the financial support of George Soros, INET is a response to the global
financial crisis that started in 2007.
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energy and, in the case of the modern economies, produces waste
and pollution. Georgescu-Roegen argued that because classical
economics does not take into account the basic laws of entropy,
it is fundamentally flawed.
When Georgescu-Roegen first argued his thesis back in the
1930s, economists did not bother to respond. Pollution and
depletion of natural resources were not on any academic agenda.
But if economics is to become a scientific endeavor, it must
consider the entropy accounting of production.While nowmuch
discussed, themes such as energy sources, sustainability, and
pollution are still absent from the considerations of mainstream
economics.
It should be clear that these issues cannot be solved with
a mathematical algorithm. As a society, we are far from being
able, or willing, to make a reasonable assessment of the entropy
balance of our activities, economic and other. But a science of
economics should at least be able to estimate (perhaps urgently)
the time scales of these processes.
Economic growth and wealth creation are therefore based
on creating order and complexity. Understanding growth,
and eventually business cycles and instabilities, calls for an
understanding of how complexity evolves—a more difficult task
than understanding the numerical growth of output.
Older growth theories were based on simple production
functions and population growth. Assuming that an economy
produces a kind of composite good, with appropriate production
functions, one can demonstrate that, setting aside capital, at
any time step the economy increases its production capabilities
and exhibits exponential growth. But this is a naïve view of the
economy. An increase of complexity is the key ingredient of
economic growth.
The study of economic complexity is not new. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the Austrian School of
Economics introduced the idea, typical of complex systems, that
order in market systems is a spontaneous, emerging property.
As mentioned above, this idea was already present in Adam
Smith’s invisible hand that coordinatesmarkets. The philosopher-
economist Friedrick Hayek devoted much theoretical thinking to
complexity and its role in economics.
More recently, research on economies as complex systems
started in the 1980s at The Santa Fe Institute (Santa Fe, New
Mexico). There, under the direction of the economist Bryan
Arthur, researchers developed one of the first artificial economies.
Some of the research done at the Santa Fe Institute is presented in
three books titled The Economy as an Evolving Complex System,
published by The Santa Fe Institute.
At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the
Observatory on Economic Complexity gathers and publishes
data on international trade and computes various measures of
economic complexity, including the Economic Complexity Index
(ECI) developed by Cesar Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann.
Complexity economics is now a subject of research at many
universities and economic research centers.
How can systems increase their complexity spontaneously,
thereby evolving? Lessons from biology might help. Chaitin
[12] proposed a mathematical theory based on the theory of
algorithmic complexity that he developed to explain Darwinian
evolution. Chaitin’s work created a whole new field of study—
metabiology—though his results are not universally accepted as
proof that Darwinian evolution works in creating complexity.
While no consensus exists, and no existing theory is applicable
to economics, it is nevertheless necessary to understand how
complexity is created if we want to understand how economies
grow or eventually fail to grow.
Assuming the role of complexity in creating economic growth
and wealth, how do we compare the complexity of objects as
different as pasta, washing machines and computers? And how
do we measure complexity? While complexity can be measured
by a number of mathematical measures, such as those of the
algorithmic theory of complexity, there is no meaningful way to
aggregate these measures to produce a measure of the aggregate
output.
Mainstream economics uses price—the market value of
output—to measure the aggregate output. But there is a
traditional debate on value, centered on the question of whether
price is a measure of value. A Marxist economist would argue
that value is the amount of labor necessary to produce that
output. We will stay within market economies and use price to
measure aggregate output. The next section discusses the issues
surrounding aggregation by price.
The Myth of Real Output
Aggregating so many (eventually rapidly changing) products7
quantitatively by physical standards is an impossible task.We can
categorize products and services, such as cars, computers, and
medical services but what quantities do we associate to them?
Economics has a conceptually simple answer: products are
aggregated in terms of price, the market price in free-market
economies as mentioned above, or centrally planned prices in
planned economies. The total value of goods produced in a year
is called the nominal Gross National Product (GNP). But there
are two major problems with this.
First, in practice, aggregation is unreliable: Not all products
and services are priced; many products and services are simply
exchanged or self-produced; black and illegal economies do exist
and are not negligible; data collection can be faulty. Therefore,
any number which represents the aggregate price of goods
exchanged has to be considered uncertain and subject to error.
Second, prices are subject to change. If we compare prices over
long periods of time, changes in prices can be macroscopic. For
example, the price of an average car in the USA increased by an
order of magnitude from a few thousand dollars in the 1950s to
a tens of thousands of dollars in the 2010s. Certainly cars have
changed over the years, adding features such as air conditioning,
but the amount of money in circulation has also changed.
The important question to address is whether physical growth
corresponds to the growth of nominal GNP. The classical answer
is no, as the level of prices changes. But there is a contradiction
here: to measure the eventual increase in the price level we should
be able to measure the physical growth and compare it with
7Beinhocker [31] estimates that, in the economy of a city like New York, the
number of Stock Keeping Units or SKUs, with each SKU corresponding to a
different product, to be in the order of tens of billions.
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the growth of nominal GNP. But there is no way to measure
realistically physical growth; any parameter is arbitrary.
The usual solution to this problem is to consider the price
change (increase or decrease) of a panel of goods considered to
be representative of the economy. The nominal GNP is divided by
the price index to produce what is called real GNP. This process
has two important limitations. First, the panel of representative
goods does not represent a constant fraction of the total economy
nor does it represent whole sectors, such as luxury products or
military expenditures. Second, the panel of representative goods
is not constant as products change, sometimes in very significant
ways.
Adopting an operational point of view, the meaning of the real
GNP is defined by how it is constructed: it is the nominal GNP
weighted with the price of some average panel of goods. Many
similar constructions would be possible in function of different
choices of the panel of representative goods. There is therefore
a fundamental arbitrariness in how real GNP is measured. The
growth of the real GNP represents only one of many different
possible concepts of growth. Growth does exist in some intuitive
sense, but quantifying it in some precise way is largely arbitrary.
Here we are back to the fundamental issue that economies are
complex systems.
Describing mathematically the evolution of the complexity of
an economy is a difficult, perhaps impossible, task. When we
aggregate by price, the problem becomes more tractable because
there are constraints to financial transactions essentially due to
the amount of money in circulation and rules related to the
distribution of money to different agents.
But it does not make sense to aggregate by price the output
of an entire country. We suggest that it is necessary to model
different sectors and understand the flows of money. Some
sectors might extend over national boundaries. Capital markets,
for example, are truly international (we do not model them
as purely national); the activity of transnational corporations
can span a multitude of countries. What is required is an
understanding of what happens under different rules.
Here we come upon what is probably the fundamental
problem of economics: the power structure. Who has the
power to make decisions? Studying human structures is not like
studying the behavior of a ferromagnet. Decisions and knowledge
are intertwined in what the investor George Soros has called the
reflexivity of economies.
Finance, the Banking System, and Financial
Crises
In neoclassical economics, finance is transparent; in real-world
economies, it is far from being the case. Real economies produce
complexity and evolve in ways that are difficult to understand.
Generally speaking, the financial and banking systems allow a
smooth evolution of the economic system, providing the money
necessary to sustain transactions, thereby enabling the sale and
purchase of goods and services. While theoretically providing
the money needed to sustain growth, the financial and banking
systems might either provide too little money and thereby
constrain the economy, or provide too much money and thereby
produce inflation, especially asset inflation.
Asset inflation is typically followed by asset deflation as
described by Minsky [33] in his financial instability hypothesis.
Minsky argued that capitalist economies exhibit asset inflations
due to the creation of excess money, followed by debt deflations
that, because of the fragile financial systems, can end in financial
and economic crises. Since Minsky first formulated his financial
instability hypothesis, many changes and additional analysis have
occurred.
First, it has become clear that the process of money creation
is endogenous, either by the central banks or commercial banks.
What has become apparent, especially since the 2007–2009
financial crisis, is that central banks can create money greatly in
excess of economic growth and that this money might not flow
uniformly throughout the economy but follow special, segregated
paths (or flows), eventually remaining in the financial system,
thereby producing asset inflation but little to no inflation in the
real economy.
Another important change has been globalization, with the
free flow of goods and capital in and out of countries, in
function of where it earns the highest returns or results in the
lowest tax bill. As local economies lost importance, countries
have been scrambling to transform themselves to compete with
low-cost/low-tax countries. Some Western economies have been
successful in specializing in added-value sectors such as financial
services. These countries have experienced huge inflows of capital
from all over the world, creating an additional push toward asset
inflation. In recent years, indexes such as the S&P500 have grown
at multiples of the nominal growth of their reference economies.
But within a few decades of the beginning of globalization,
some of those economies that produced low-cost manufactured
goods have captured the entire production cycle from design,
engineering, manufacturing, and servicing. Unable to compete,
Western economies started an unprecedented process of printing
money on a large scale with, as a result, the recurrence of financial
crashes followed by periods of unsustainable financial growth.
Studying such crises is a major objective of economics. ETH-
Zurich’s Didier Sornette, who started his career as a physicist
specialized in forecasting rare phenomena such as earthquakes,
made a mathematical analysis of financial crises using non-linear
dynamics and following Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis.
Together with his colleague Peter Cauwels, Sornette and Cauwels
[34] hypothesize that financial crises are critical points in a
process of superexponential growth of the economy.
Artificial Economies
As discussed above, the mathematical analysis of complex
system is difficult and might indeed be an impossible task. To
overcome this problem, an alternative route is the development
of agent-based artificial economies. Artificial economies are
computer programs that simulate economies. Agent-based
artificial economies simulate real economies creating sets of
artificial agents whose behavior resembles the behavior of real
agents.
The advantage of artificial economies is that they can
be studied almost empirically without the need to perform
mathematical analysis, which can be extremely difficult or
impossible. The disadvantage is that they are engineered systems
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whose behavior depends on the engineering parameters. The risk
is that one finds exactly what one wants to find. The development
of artificial markets with zero-intelligence agents was intended
to overcome this problem, studying those market properties
that depend only on the trading mechanism and not on agent
characteristics.
There is by now a considerable literature on the development
of artificial economies and the design of agents. See Chakraborti
et al. [20] for a recent review. Leigh Tesfatsion at Iowa State
University keeps a site which provides a wealth of information
on agent-based systems: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/
ace.htm.
Evolution of Neoclassical Economics
Among classical economists, efforts are underway to bring the
discipline closer to an empirical science. Among the “new”
classical economists is David Colander, who has argued that the
term “mainstream” economics does not reflect current reality
because of the many ramifications of mainstream theories.
Some of the adjustments underway are new versions of DSGE
theories which now include a banking system and deviations
from perfect rationality as well as the question of liquidity. As
observed above, DSGEmodels are a sort of complex systemmade
up of many intelligent agents. It is therefore possible, in principle,
to view complex systems as an evolution of DSGEs. However,
most basic concepts of DSGEs, and in particular equilibrium,
rational expectations, and the lack of interaction between agents,
have to be deeply modified. Should DSGEs evolve as modern
complex systems, the new generations of models will be very
different from the current generation of DSGEs.
Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the status of economics as
an empirical science. We first analyzed the epistemology of
economics, remarking on the necessity to carefully analyze what
we consider observations (e.g., volatility, inflation) and to pose
questions that can be reasonably answered based on observations.
In physics, observables are processes obtained through
the theory itself, using complex instruments. Physical theory
responds to empirical tests in toto; individual statements have
little empirical content. In economics, given the lack of a
comprehensive theory, observations are elementary observations,
such as prices, and theoretical terms are related to observables in
a direct way, without cross validation. This weakens the empirical
content of today’s prevailing economic theory.
We next critiqued neoclassical economics, concluding that
it is not an empirical science but rather the study of an
artificial idealized construction with little connection to real-
world economies. This conclusion is based on the fact that
neoclassical economics is embodied in DSGE models which are
only weakly related to empirical reality.
We successively explored new ideas that hold the promise
of developing economics more along the lines of an empirical
science. Econophysics, an interdisciplinary effort to place
economics on a sure scientific grounding, has produced a
number of results related to the analysis of financial time
series, in particular the study of inverse power laws. But while
econophysics has produced a number of models, it has yet to
propose a new global economic theory.
Other research efforts are centered on looking at economies as
complex evolutionary systems that produce order and increasing
complexity. Environmental constraints due to the accounting
of energy and entropy are beginning to gain attention in some
circles. As with econophysics, the study of the economy as a
complex system has yet produced no comprehensive theory.
The most developed area of new research efforts is the
analysis of instabilities, building on Hyman Minsky’s financial
instability hypothesis. Instabilities are due to interactions
between a real productive economy subject to physical
constraints, and a financial system whose growth has no physical
constraints.
Lastly, efforts are also being made among classical economists
to bring their discipline increasingly into the realm of an
empirical science, adding for example the banking system and
boundedly rational behavior to the DSGE.
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